Trying to Squeeze into the Middle Seat: Application of the Airline Deregulation Act\u27s Preemption Provision to Internet Travel Agencies by Colvard, Aubrey B.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 75 | Issue 3 Article 7
2010
Trying to Squeeze into the Middle Seat:
Application of the Airline Deregulation Act's
Preemption Provision to Internet Travel Agencies
Aubrey B. Colvard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aubrey B. Colvard, Trying to Squeeze into the Middle Seat: Application of the Airline Deregulation Act's Preemption Provision to Internet
Travel Agencies, 75 J. Air L. & Com. 705 (2010)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol75/iss3/7
TRYING TO SQUEEZE INTO THE MIDDLE SEAT:
APPLICATION OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION




I. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF INTERNET TRAVEL
AGENCIES ................................. 706
A. DEVELOPMENT .................................. 706
B. M ECHANICS ..................................... 708
II. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ........... 710
A. LIFE BEFORE THE ADA ..................... 710
B. THE INCEPTION OF THE ADA ................ 712
C. THE ADA's PREEMPTION PROVISION............. 713
III. APPLICATION OF THE PREEMPTION
PROVISIO N ........................................ 716
A. "RELATES To" .................................. 716
B. "SERVICES"........................................ 719
C . "PRICES" ........ ................................ 724
D. "AIR CARRIER" .................................... 726
IV. ADA APPLICATION TO INTERNET TRAVEL
AGEN CIES ......................................... 731
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT ..................... 731
B. THE "RELATES To" INQUIRY .................... 732
C. THE "PRICES, ROUTES, OR SERVICES" INQUIRY ... 733
D. THE "AIR CARRIER" INQUIRY .................... 737
V. CONCLUSION... ................. ...... 739
INTRODUCTIONIN TODAYS INCREASINGLY mobile society, internet travel
agencies function as a vital part of the airline industry. What
* J.D., cum laude, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2010;
B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 2004. The author would like to thank her
family and friends for their love and support.
705
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
was once predominantly controlled by brick-and-mortar travel
agencies is now under the dominion of modern internet web-
sites, such as Expedia, Travelocity, and Orbitz, which offer travel
booking services to customers twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week. This revolution in booking travel is due largely to
the growing popularity of the internet; and as the internet's
prominence continues to rise, so too will the prominence of in-
ternet travel agencies. With this growth comes questions regard-
ing the legal implications of internet travel agencies' actions.
Typically, a cause of action brought against an airline falls
under the jurisdiction of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), as
the ADA's preemption provision expressly prohibits states from
"enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule, regulation, standard,
or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to
rates, routes or services of any air carrier."' ADA preemption,
however, is not black and white and this comment will seek to
answer the question of whether internet travel agencies, which
serve as a vital part of the airline industry by facilitating airline
travel booking, may take advantage of the same preemption pro-
vision. Parts I and II provide a brief background on the develop-
ment of internet travel agencies and discuss the ADA's inception
and evolution. Parts III and IV then analyze what role, if any,
the ADA plays in the internet travel business. Because of the
vagueness of many of the ADA preemption provision's terms,
however, application of the preemption provision is often de-
pendant on factual determinations. Though Congress likely did
not anticipate the development of internet travel agencies when
it promulgated the ADA's preemption provision, the preemp-
tion provision was developed as a flexible concept. Thus, if the
facts and circumstances in a given case command it, internet
travel agencies can indeed squeeze into the ADA's preemption
provision.
I. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF INTERNET
TRAVEL AGENCIES
A. DEVELOPMENT
With the dawn of the internet came a revolution in travel
booking. Gone are the days of travel agents, along with their
hefty commissions and imposing influence over airlines.2 Dur-
I Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
2 Rodney R. Akers, Overview of Internet Travel Booking, 5 LAw. J. 6 (2003).
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ing the late 1990s and early 2000s, several internet travel agen-
cies emerged, and three carved out a dominant niche in the
market: Travelocity, Expedia, and Orbitz. 3 As of 2003, the oper-
ations of these three companies comprised over forty percent of
the market.' Each company emerged from different begin-
nings, and each initially sought to serve different purposes.5
Travelocity, the oldest of the three, has roots dating as far
back as the 1960s.6 Travelocity evolved from Sabre Holdings, an
electronic travel booking system created in the 1960s, and was
used exclusively by airlines and travel agencies.' In the mid-
1990s, Sabre developed Travelocity in order to provide consum-
ers a direct means of travel booking.' This concept was revolu-
tionary, as it provided the first means for customers to search
for, compare, select, and book travel without the help of a travel
agent or an airline.9 Travelocity was a publicly traded company
until 2007, when Silver Lake Partners acquired Sabre and Texas
Pacific Group."o In 2004, Travelocity reported $7.4 billion in
gross travel bookings, evidence of Travelocity's significant role
in the travel industry."
Like Travelocity, Expedia emerged in the mid-1990s as a
means to providing users "a revolutionary new way to research
and book travel."' Expedia began as a small subsidiary of
Microsoft, and later spun out of its parent company to become a
publicly traded company in 1999.1' Since its inception, Expedia
has grown to be a leading independent company in the travel




6 About Us, SABRE HOLDINGS, http://www.sabre-holdings.com/aboutUs/in-
dex.html (last visited June 2, 2010).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Saul Hansell, Fare Idea Returns to Haunt Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/27/business/fare-idea-returns-to-
haunt-airlines.html.
10 See Press Release, Sabre Holdings, Sabre Holdings To Be Acquired by TPG
and Silver Lake Partners for $5 Billion, (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.silverlake.
com/pdfs/sabre-press-release-final-121206.pdf.
11 See SABRE HOLDINGS, http://www.sabre-holdings.com/ourBrands/travelocity
.html (last visited June 26, 2010).
12 EXPEDIA, INC., http://overview.expediainc.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=190013&
p=overview (last visited June 27, 2010).
13 Id.
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ActiveCorp (IAC) in 2002.14 In 2009, Expedia reported $21.5
billion in gross bookings.1 5 In 1999, a consortium of airlines
formed to address Travelocity and Expedia's growing domi-
nance in the travel industry.1 6 To curb the increasing domi-
nance of Travelocity and Expedia, this airline consortium-
American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, North-
west Airlines and United Air Lines-sought to strike a bargain
with Expedia."7 The airlines agreed to provide Expedia access
to their discounted internet fares in return for half of Expedia.18
Expedia's parent corporation, Microsoft, did not react favorably
to this proposal and rejected the idea.19
In retaliation, the airline conglomerate created their own in-
ternet travel agency; that company ultimately became known as
Orbitz.2 0 Immediately out of the gate, Orbitz was one of the
fastest growing internet sites in history, selling $950 million
worth of tickets in its first six months.2 1 Today, Orbitz has
evolved into one of the leading internet travel agencies and has
grown to include other internet travel sites such as CheapTick-
ets and the international online travel brand, ebookers. 2 2 Most
recently, Orbitz reported gross bookings of $2.565 billion for
the third quarter of 2009.2
B. MECHANICS
Internet travel agencies, through their websites, provide indi-
viduals a way to search for, compare, and purchase airline tick-
ets.2 Typically, the sale begins when a customer logs on to an
internet travel agency's website to search for a ticket.25 The
search function allows customers to sort flights based on several
different criteria, including cost, time, airline, and number of
14 Id.
15 Id.




20 ORBITZ WORLDWIDE, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=212312
&p=irol-faq#33252 (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
21 See Hansell, supra note 9.
22 ORBITZ WORLDWIDE, supra note 20.
23 See Orbitz Worldwide, Inc. Reports Third Quarter 2009 Results, ORBrrz WORLD-
WIDE (Nov. 5, 2009), http://pressroom.orbitz.com/index.php?s=43&item=767.
24 E.g., Amadeus Global Travel Distrib., S.A. v. Orbitz, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 2d




connections.21 This data is then compiled by computer software
owned by the internet travel agencies to produce a list of possi-
ble flights and their correlating fares.2 7 This list includes spe-
cific information like seat availability and alternate routes, and
customers can arrange the list in various ways to determine
which flight best fits their needs." Once a customer selects an
itinerary, the internet travel agency's computer software trans-
mits that selection to a global distribution system (GDS), which
will confirm the flight availability and price for the customer.
The internet travel agency then provides this information to the
customer for confirmation and purchase.o Once the customer
purchases the ticket, the purchase information is transmitted
back to the GDS."
Today, internet travel agencies occupy a prominent niche in
the travel industry. Recently, however, the economic crisis has
taken its toll on internet travel agencies and the travel industry
as a whole. Because most internet travel agencies charge cus-
tomers booking fees, many customers have been turning to
other means of booking travel, such as using airline websites di-
rectly.3 2 To boost business, many internet travel agencies have
begun lowering booking fees. 33
Another important aspect of internet travel agencies is the
unique pricing structure for airline tickets. While there are
often deals to be had on airline tickets, air transportation pric-
ing is not a matter of simple supply and demand economics.3 4
The price-governing structure for airline tickets is referred to as
"yield management."- Yield management is essentially a com-
puter program that allocates fares on a "flight-by-flight, day-by-
day basis," which is designed to ensure that as many seats as pos-
sible are filled on each flight. 6 Airlines then monitor this sys-







32 Dennis Schaal, How Expedia Handled the Crisis, Took 'Air Out of the Competition',
TNOOZ (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.tnooz.com/2010/01/06/news/how-expedia-
handled-the-crisis-took-air-out-of-the-competition/.
33 Id.
3 Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, 128 F.3d 77, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1997).
35 Id.
s6 Id. at 85.
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necessary.17 Fare adjustments are also made as needed to ad-
dress competition from other airlines." Indeed, "in no other
industry has the idea of demand-based pricing been as thor-
oughly embraced as in the airline industry."" Rather than focus
on a cost-plus basis, airline prices are driven predominantly by
demand, with seats on flights serving as their biggest
commodity.40
Over the past fifteen years, internet travel agencies developed
significantly, and they now play a prominent role in the travel
industry, providing booking and travel accommodations to mil-
lions of people every year. With their development and increas-
ing prominence come questions about the legal implications of
internet travel agencies' actions. Can internet travel agencies
squeeze into the ADA's preemption provision?
II. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
A. LIFE BEFORE THE ADA
Because internet travel agencies play such a dominant role in
the travel industry, the question that arises is what sort of regula-
tions or preemptions, if any, apply to these entities? More spe-
cifically, can internet travel agencies take advantage of the
ADA's preemption provision? To fully answer these questions, it
is important to first look at the history behind the ADA. Prior to
the passage of the ADA in 1978 air travel was far too expensive
for most people to afford." In 1964, fourteen years prior to the
ADA, there were 88.52 million passenger enplanements; com-
paratively, in 2000, there were 666.15 million. 4 2 Rather than be-
ing seen as an everyday mode of transport like it is today, air
travel was seen as an elitist institution, meant only "for Jackie
Kennedy and Ari Onassis and the Beatles."4 3 Indeed, the posh





41 Michelle McDonald, Change Forever: The Transition from Total Government Con-
trol of the Airline Industry to Open Competition Has Been a Wild Ride that Some Enjoyed






prices reached such astronomical heights is a classic study in
politics.4 5
Airline regulation began in 1938 with the passage of the Civil
Aeronautics Act (CAA) .46 Prior to this Act, the only form of air-
line governance was the Airmail Act of 1925.47 Originally, air-
lines could only profit from airmail contracts, but because of the
extreme competitiveness of the awarding of these contracts, air-
lines were not making any money.4 8 It was at this time that C.R.
Smith, the godfather of American Airlines, stepped in and con-
vinced the government that airline regulation was necessary to
the survival of the airline industry.49 As a result, the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 came to be, "giving birth to what would be-
come a monument to bureaucracy gone very, very wrong."so
The CAA significantly changed the aviation landscape,
amending or repealing all prior legislation relating to the avia-
tion industry." For the next four decades, the CAA-created
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) governed the aviation industry.
Though the CAA did not specify exclusive federal jurisdiction
over aviation issues, "there was very little left for states to do in
aviation except, perhaps, establish and maintain airports, and
cooperate with the Federal Government. "5 Problematically, the
CAB was far from an efficient governing body; instead, the CAB
created an extremely expensive, inefficient, and non-competi-
tive airline industry. 4 Often, it took several years for an airline
to apply for and be awarded a new route. Indeed, one notorious
story tells of how the paperwork for an airline's applications to
acquire new Hawaii routes in the 1960s reached heights of over
nine feet!5 5
45 Id.
46 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958).
47 Airmail Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-359, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805.
48 See McDonald, supra note 41.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Donald J. Frenette, Avoiding Preemption Under the Airline Deregulation Act:
Traditional Personal Injury Clain Survive, 17 Miss. C. L. REv. 171, 173 (1995).
52 Id.
5 Id.
54 See McDonald, supra note 41.
55 Id.
7112010]
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B. THE INCEPTION OF THE ADA
A shakeup in the airline industry occurred in 1970 with the
debut of the Boeing 747, a passenger airplane that could carry
550 passengers-a monster compared to already existing air-
planes that had a maximum capacity of 190 passengers. 6
Though airlines were quick to acquire the new airplane, because
the price of tickets remained so high, ticket sales never equaled
seating availability and the acquisition of 747s delivered a severe
economic blow to airlines.17 For example, United Airlines,
which had reported earnings of $45 million in 1969, reported a
loss of $46 million the following year due, the airline admitted,
to its "'premature' introduction of the 'jumbo jet.' "58 Mean-
while, as transcontinental and intercontinental airfare prices re-
mained astronomically high, a California-based airline, Pacific
Southwest, found a way to provide cheap airfare to passengers.
Pacific Southwest provided routes wholly inside the state of Cali-
fornia, which kept it out of the purview of the CAB's regulation
scheme.60 Pacific Southwest created a model that offered inter-
state fares for less than twenty-five dollars, a fare that was afford-
able to the everyday person.6 1 Most notably, at a time when
airlines were struggling financially, Pacific Southwest was profit-
ing.6 2 However, the major airlines were slow to catch on.6 1 In-
stead of following Pacific Southwest's example, the major
airlines instead tried to attract customers by offering glitzy perks
such as free drinks, onboard piano lounges, and even luaus on
Hawaii flights. 64 Needless to say, these "incentives" did nothing
to attract customers and airlines continued to struggle.65
It was not until the mid-1970s that the government began to
realize that the bureaucratic CAB regulation system was not
working. 66 Senator Edward Kennedy was elected as chairman of
the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedures of













Kennedy, then with an eye on the White House, took it upon
himself and his Committee to begin discussions about airline
deregulation. 7 Senator Kennedy's opening statements during
one hearing beautifully summed up the state of airline deregula-
tion: "Regulators all too often encourage or approve unreasona-
bly high prices, inadequate service, and anti-competitive
behavior. The cost of this regulation is always passed on to the
consumer. And that cost is astronomical."6 8 Together with the
support of President Carter, the ADA of 1978 was signed into
law. 69
C. THE ADA's PREEMPTION PROVISION
Prior to the ADA, expressed federal preemption of state air-
line regulation did not exist, which allowed states free reign to
regulate intrastate airfares in areas not covered by the CAA.7 o
The old CAk even afforded a sort of savings clause for states,
providing that "nothing contained in the Act would abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute but
the provisions of the Act would be in addition to such reme-
dies."7 ' However, with the inception of the ADA, Congress de-
termined that "maximum reliance on competitive market forces
would best further efficiency, innovation, and low prices as well
as variety and quality of air transportation services."7 2 The the-
ory behind the ADA was that if airlines were left to their own
devices, airlines "could provide better services and lower fares
for passengers through free entry into and expansion in the sys-
tem, whereas the detailed regulatory procedures had restricted
this in the past."7  With the passage of the ADA, the CAB was
gradually phased out, and in its place free market forces now
had control over airline prices, routes, and services.
67 Id.
68 John Berlau, Ted Kennedy's Deregulatory Legacy on Airlines and Trucking,
OPENMARKET.ORG (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.openmarket.org/2009/08/26/
kennedys-deregulator-legacy-on-airlines-and-trucking/.
69 See McDonald, supra note 41.
70 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
71 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 601, § 1106, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed
by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958) (current version codified at 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 40120(c) (2006)).
72 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (internal quotations omitted).
73 Frenette, supra note 51, at 174.
74 Id.
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To facilitate the ADA's objectives, Congress included a pre-
emption provision in the Act.7 5 Section 1305(a) (1) of the Act
provides that:
No State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency
or other political agency of two or more states shall enact or en-
force any law, rule, regulation, or standard, or other provision
having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier having authority under title IV of this
Act to provide air transportation.
The power of federal law to preempt state law comes from
one of the fundamental principles asserted in the Constitution,
the Supremacy Clause. 7 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,
state law in conflict with federal law is given no effect.78 In 1994,
the ADA was superseded by the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act.79 The FAA Authorization Act retained the
preemption provision, however, which is now found at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)." With the new statute, Congress changed the
phrase "rates, routes, or service" to "prices, routes, or services";
however, Congress did not intend this change to have any over-
arching effect or significantly alter the existing law."'
As with any statute, the first step toward interpreting the
ADA's preemption provision is to look to congressional intent
and "begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accu-
rately expresses the legislative purpose."8 2 The intent behind
the ADA's preemption provision was to avoid any future con-
flicting state law regulations that might hinder the free market
operation of the aviation industry. 3  Essentially, Congress
wanted to ensure that states would not attempt to fill "the regu-
latory void created by the ADA, which removed the preexisting
75 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1) (2006).
76 Id.
77 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
78 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
- Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 286 n.4 (5th Cir.
2002).
80 Id.
81 Id. For the purposes of clarity, both the ADA preemption provision and the
FAA Authorization Act preemption provision will be referred to in this comment
as "ADA preemption."
82 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992).
8 Frenette, supra note 51, at 179.
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utility-type federal regulatory structure."" Under the ADA, state
law is preempted "where the Congress has expressly preempted
state law, where congressional intent to preempt may be in-
ferred from the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme,
or where state law actually conflicts with federal law or interferes
with the achievement of congressional objectives." 85
Though Congress intended the ADA's preemption provision
to be broad in nature, Congress did not intend "to preempt all
state claims for personal injury."" Evidence of this is found in
the fact that airlines are required to hold insurance or self-insur-
ance under the FAA Act that covers "amounts for which . . . air
carriers may become liable for bodily injuries to or the death of
any person, or for loss of or damages to property of others, re-
sulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft."" If the
ADA was meant to preempt every state law dealing with airlines'
tortious conduct, the statutory requirement for insurance cover-
age would be rendered "nugatory."8 8
Further, Congress did not intend for the ADA to preempt or-
dinary breach-of-contract claims, as evidenced by the fact that
the statute mentions nothing about the preemption of causes of
action "seeking recovery solely for the airline's breach of its
own, self-imposed undertakings."" The Supreme Court recog-
nized this fact, noting that "terms and conditions airlines offer
and passengers accept are privately ordered obligations" and
thus should not be preempted.o Enforcing contract obligations
"simply holds parties to their agreements" and further, "ad-
vances the market efficiency that the ADA was designed to pro-
mote."" Court adjudication of contract claims also "accords
due recognition to Congress' retention of the FAA's saving
clause, which preserves the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute."9 2 Thus, congressional intent is best served by
an interpretation of the ADA's preemption statute that does not
8 Stuart J. Starry, Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation: Tort Litigation Under
49 U.S.C. § 1305, 58 J. AIR L. & CoM. 657, 660 (1993).
85 Huntleigh v. La. State Bd. of Private Sec. Exarn'rs, 906 F. Supp. 357, 360
(M.D. La. 1995).
86 Hodges v. Delta Airlines Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995).
87 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(q) (2009).
88 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338.
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apply to contract claims, nor broadly to all tort claims for per-
sonal injuries.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PREEMPTION PROVISION
Though not all-encompassing, since its inception the preemp-
tion provision of the ADA has enjoyed a wide-reaching effect.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, case law determining whether the ADA preemption ap-
plied "divided fairly neatly between economic or regulatory is-
sues and personal injury, damage or negligence issues," with the
former being preempted and the latter being open to state-law
governance." Though there was some disagreement on the
subject, most courts that took up the issue of ADA preemption
broadly interpreted the provision as a "prohibition against in-
cursions into the field of air carrier regulation."9 4
In 1992, the Supreme Court adjudicated the issue of ADA pre-
emption and analyzed the language of the provision to hold that
it was meant by Congress to have a wide-reaching effect, prohib-
iting "[s]tate enforcement of actions having a connection with
or reference to airline rates, routes, or services."" Application
of the preemption provision, however, is not a black and white
process. Many of the terms that make up the preemption provi-
sion are vague, such as "relates to," "services," "prices," and "air
carrier."96 To determine whether ADA preemption can apply to
internet travel agencies, each of these ambiguities must be ana-
lyzed in turn to discover Congress's underlying intent.
A. "RELATES To"
The preemption provision is somewhat vague and has led to
some divergence between courts as to the section's application.
First, the phrases "relates to" or "relating to" have been the
source of much debate." In construing "relating to," the Su-
preme Court in Morales, determined that Congress intended the
preemption provision to have a broad scope.98 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, first cited Black's Law Dictionary to de-
fine the term "relating to" as "to stand in some relation; to have
93 Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
94 Id.
95 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
96 See generally id.
97 See generally id.
98 Id. at 383.
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bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association
with or connection with," espousing that these words "express a
broad pre-emptive purpose."" The Court then went on to com-
pare the ADA preemption provision to similar preemption stat-
utes that were the subject of previous judicial interpretation,
noting that "the relevant language of the ADA is identical.""'o
For example, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Court held that
under the ERISA preemption provision, which also uses the
phrase "relates to," any state law that has a "connection with, or
reference to, such a plan," is preempted by the statute.101 Thus,
since the ADA preemption language is identical to other such
statutes, the Court found "it appropriate to adopt the same stan-
dard" and determined that " [s] tate enforcement actions having
a connection with or reference to airline 'rates, routes, or ser-
vices' are pre-empted." 0 2 Given this conclusion, the Supreme
Court in Morales held that, because the term "relates to" is
meant to be interpreted broadly, fare advertising guidelines
promulgated by the National Association of Attorneys General
were preempted by the ADA.' 3
Since Morales, courts have followed the Supreme Court's gui-
dance and broadly interpreted the ADA preemption provision
to hold that the statute preempts state causes of action that have
"a connection with or reference to" air transportation.1 0 4 For
example, the First Circuit interpreted the term "relates to" to
pertain to state laws that have "a forbidden significant effect
upon rates, routes or services."105 In United Parcel Service, Inc. v.
Flores-Galarza, UPS challenged a Puerto Rican statute that pro-
hibited interstate carriers from making deliveries without first
showing proof of the recipient's or carrier's payment of a terri-
torial excise tax.' The court held that ADA preemption does
apply to the statute because "[t] he challenged scheme both re-
fers to and has a forbidden significant effect on UPS's prices,
routes or services. "107 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit, in Branche
99 Id. at 382.
100 Id. at 384.
101 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
102 Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (internal citation omitted).
10 Id. at 390.
104 Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2003);
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 335 (1st Cir. 2003);
Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1997).
1o United Parcel Serv., Inc., 318 F.3d at 335.
106 See id. at 335-36.
107 Id. at 335.
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v. Airtran Airways, Inc., used the interpretation of "relates to,"
promulgated by the First Circuit in United Parcel Services, to hold
that the Florida Whistleblower Act was not preempted by the
ADA because the Act did not specifically address airline prices,
routes, or services.108 Indeed, "the only possible basis for pre-
emption is if it has a sufficient-i.e., significant-impact on
those services."1o' Similarly, the Second Circuit, in Abdu-Brisson
v. Delta Airlines Inc., held that a New York anti-age discrimination
statute was not preempted by the ADA.110 The court compared
the anti-age discrimination statute to the regulations at issue in
Morales, which were a direct regulation on marketing practices,
noting the contrast to the statute at issue and holding that
"whether an airline discriminates on the basis of age (or race or
sex) has little or nothing to do with competition or
efficiency.""'
Undoubtedly, the ADA's preemption provision and the term
"relates to" has an "unusual breadth," and is interpreted broadly
in order to "further [Congress'] purpose of deregulating the air-
line industry."' 12 Though broad, ADA preemption is not with-
out limits. Indeed, in Morales, the Supreme Court stated that it
was not seeking to "set out on a road that leads to pre-emption
of state laws against gambling and prostitution as applied to air-
lines," and further noted that "some state actions may affect [air-
lines] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to have
pre-emptive effect." 1 3 This language surfaced again when the
Supreme Court decided American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens." In
Wolens, the Court struck down a state consumer fraud statute
affecting airlines, yet declined to apply the ADA's preemption
provision to the consumers' breach-of-contract claim. The
Court held that the provision should not be read so broadly as
"to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-im-
posed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airlines'
alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.""'
Though neither the ADA nor the Supreme Court have pro-
vided a specific definition for the term "relates to," the term has
1o8 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1253-54.
109 Id. at 1255.
110 128 F.3d at 84.
-n Id.
112 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 548 (2008).
113 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992).
114 See generally Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
11 Id. at 228.
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been construed by various circuits and courts to generally refer
to statutes or regulations that both mention and have a "forbid-
den" or "significant" effect on airline prices, routes, or ser-
vices."' While this interpretation necessarily promotes a broad
application of the ADA, courts understand the term to have
some limits; ADA preemption is not to be applied to situations
that are only tenuously or remotely related to airline prices,
routes, or services.1 1 7
B. "SERVICES"
The second source of ambiguity in the ADA's preemption
provision is the term "services." Because neither the statute nor
the Supreme Court provides a precise definition for the sorts of
actions that constitute "services," courts have continued to strug-
gle with application of the term."'s Case law has promulgated
two lines of thought regarding what constitutes a "service" for
the purposes of ADA preemption."' The first line of cases fa-
vors a more narrow definition of the term, typically holding that
"services" refers only to common occurrences that take place on
an airplane during a flight, not instances before or after a
flight. 20o In Charas v. Trans World Airlines, for example, the
Ninth Circuit held that the ADA's preemption provision did not
apply to a passenger's suit against an airline seeking damages for
injuries sustained when the passenger tripped over a piece of
luggage left in the airplane aisle by a flight attendant.1 2 1 The
court held that "Congress did not intend to preempt passen-
gers' run-of-the-mill personal injury claims" when it enacted the
ADA; therefore, the use of the word "services" refers only to "the
prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point
transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail" and not to actions
such as beverage service, baggage handling, or boarding and de-
planing procedures.12 2 Similarly, in Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., the Third Circuit held that a defamation
116 See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 335 (1st Cir.
2003); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2003);
Abdu-Brisson, 128 F.3d 77 at 84.
11 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
118 Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
119 Id.
120 See Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir.
1998); Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir.
1998).
121 160 F.3d at 1266.
122 Id. at 1261.
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claim made by a travel agency against an airline for allegedly
distributing letters to the travel agent's customers claiming that
the tickets customers had purchased from the travel agent were
"considered stolen" was not preempted by the ADA.12 3 The
court, like the Ninth Circuit in Charas, found support for this
determination in the congressional intent behind the ADA, es-
pousing that the ADA was "intended to prevent the states from
re-regulating airline operations so that competitive market
forces could function." 12 4 Thus, the proper inquiry is to deter-
mine whether the regulation at issue "frustrates deregulation by
interfering with competition through public utility-style regula-
tion," but when the law at issue "does not have a regulatory ef-
fect, it is 'too tenuous, remote, or peripheral' to be
preempted."61 2  Because the "application of state law" to the cir-
cumstances at bar in Taj Mahal "[did] not frustrate Congres-
sional intent, nor [did] it impose a state utility-like regulation on
the airlines," the Third Circuit determined that the travel
agency's claim for defamation against Delta did not relate to the
airline's service, despite the fact that the airline's actions argua-
bly may refer to a service. Thus, the travel agent's claims were
not preempted by the ADA. 12 6
While some circuits have narrowly interpreted the term "ser-
vices," other circuits follow a second line of thought and believe
that the term should be more broadly construed, defining "ser-
vices" to "refer[ ] to the provision or anticipated provision of
labor from the airline to its passengers. "127 For example, the
Fifth Circuit, in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., determined that a
passenger's suit against an airline for injuries sustained when a
case of rum fell from an overhead compartment and struck her
on the arm, causing injury, was not preempted by the ADA, as
the claim had "no specific reference to airline services" and en-
forcement of the claim would not significantly affect the air-
line's service.' 2 8 The Fifth Circuit determined that the term
"services" is typically meant to refer to "a bargained-for or antici-
pated provision of labor from one party to another."1 2 ' Evi-
123 Taj Mahal Travel, Inc., 164 F.3d at 187.
124 Id. at 194 (citing Charas, 160 F.3d at 1264-65).
125 Id. (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992)).
126 Id. at 195.
127 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 222-23 (2d Cir.
2008).
128 44 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1995).
129 Id. at 336.
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dence of this bargain includes "ticketing, boarding procedures,
provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition
to the transportation itself.""so Further, the Seventh Circuit in
Travel All Over the World v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia held that a
travel agent's claims against an airline for canceling customers'
tickets and for slander and defamation were not preempted by
the ADA because the claims did not constitute a "bargained-for
or anticipated provision of labor from one party to another."1 3 1
"Certainly," the court noted, the airline's disparaging comments
regarding the travel agent's services "were not part of any con-
tractual arrangement" between the airline and the travel agent's
clients. 13 2 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit, in Branche v. Airtran
Airways, Inc., determined that a terminated airline employee's
cause of action for breach of the Florida Wistleblower Act
against a former employer-airline was not preempted, opining
that a "broader reading of th[e] term ['services'] is prefera-
ble.""3 The court favored a broad reading of the term "ser-
vices" as there was no reason for a more "truncated reading" of
the term since "the ADA's pre-emption clause is properly af-
forded an extremely broad scope" and concerns regarding the
preemptive language's misapplication are misplaced.1 3 4 Thus,
because the terminated airline employee's cause of action did
not "significantly affect any bargained-for element of air carrier
operations, and accordingly ... [did] not affect airline services,"
it was not preempted by the ADA.'
Recently, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
what actions fall within the definition of "services" for the pur-
poses of federal preemption statutes when it examined the pre-
emption provision of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA) in
Rowe v. New Hampshire.'"' The Court addressed the issue of
whether or not a Maine state statute that regulated shipment of
tobacco products into Maine was preempted by the MCA, which
borrowed its preemption provision language from the ADA, spe-
cifically the stipulation that "[a] [s]tate . . . may not enact or
enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any
motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of prop-
130 Id.
13 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996).
132 Id.
133 Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2003).
13 Id.
1s5 Id. at 1257.
136 Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 997-98 (2008).
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erty."' 3 7 The Court, citing Morales, held that "federal law must
. . . pre-empt Maine's efforts directly to regulate carrier ser-
vices."1 Courts since Rowe have taken this decision to define
services broadly, not narrowly, so as "to extend beyond prices,
schedules, origins, and destinations."1 3 9 For example, in Air
Transport Ass'n of America v. Cuomo, the Second Circuit construed
the Rowe decision to broadly interpret the term "services," hold-
ing that "requiring airlines to provide food, water, electricity,
and restrooms to passengers during lengthy ground delay does
relate to the service of an air carrier." Thus, the ADA preempts
actions such as these. 14 0
Of the circuits that have adopted a broader interpretation of
the term "services," courts are often split on the methodology
they employ to ultimately make the determination. District
courts have largely followed one of two methods: (1) an "ad hoc
approach," under which "courts examine the totality of the cir-
cumstances and determine whether the action at issue is com-
monly related to air travel;" or (2) a "three-part test"
promulgated by Justice Sotomayor during her tenure as a dis-
trict judge, which takes the analysis beyond an ad hoc approach
to ascertain whether the claim affects airline service directly or
remotely, and further, whether the underlying conduct was nec-
essary to the provision of that service.1 4 1 Though the applica-
tion of one test over another may affect the ultimate
determination of whether or not something constitutes a ser-
vice, often the result under each test is the same. 14 2
Under the first method-the ad hoc approach-courts ex-
amine "the extent to which [the actions at issue] are common-
place and ordinary, and relate directly to air travel." 143 "For
example, aiding an elderly passenger" to board and deplane is
"commonplace and ordinary, and relate [s] directly to air
travel."1 44 Therefore, any action by that elderly passenger
against the airline for injuries suffered while boarding or de-
137 Id. at 993 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c) (1)).
13 Id. at 998.
139 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir.
2008).
14o Id. (emphasis added).
141 Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 359-60 (citing Trinidad v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 521,
524-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).




planing would be preempted by the ADA because the airline's
actions relate to its "service."145 On the other hand, actions that
are not commonplace and ordinary do not constitute services
for the purposes of the ADA's preemption provision. It is not
commonplace or ordinary, for example, for a pilot to contact a
ground crew to inform them he believes a passenger is smoking
marijuana on the airplane. 14 6 Therefore, any claim by the al-
leged pot-smoking passenger against the airline relating to the
pilot's actions would not be preempted by the ADA. 14 7 This line
of cases applying an ad hoc approach is careful to distinguish
services from negligent actions that resulted in personal in-
jury.148 While services may be preempted, "ADA preemption
will not apply even to actions that are regularly performed" if
the "action was performed in a negligent manner and resulted
in personal injury." Thus, this approach complies with the Su-
preme Court's determination that ADA preemption should not
be extended to the negligent acts of airlines."4 '
The second broad method to ADA preemption consists of a
three-part test promulgated by Justice Sotomayor during her
tenure as a district court judge. Under this approach, courts
must "first determine whether the activity at issue in the claim is
a service," then, if the activity is in fact a service, courts must
"ascertain whether the claim affects the airline service directly or
tenuously, remotely, or peripherally," and finally, courts "must
determine whether the underlying tortious conduct was reason-
ably necessary to the provision of the service." 5 o The first prong
of this test is similar to the ad hoc approach "in that the determi-
nation of service [s] rests heavily on the extent to which the activ-
ity in question is ordinary and relates directly to air travel."'
Thus, an activity such as an air carrier's refusal to board passen-
gers is preempted because it is "a service related to air travel,"
yet preemption would not apply to injuries suffered by passen-
gers on a bus tour that was part of a package sold by an airline
because "ground transportation is not related to air travel."1 5 2
145 See id.
146 See generally Curley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
see also id. at 360.
147 Weiss, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 360 (citing Curley, 846 F. Supp. 280).
14 Id. at 360.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 361 (citing Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
151 Id.
152 Id. (citing Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 221-22).
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The second prong of the test seeks to ensure that the claim is
not related too remotely or tenuously to the services provided by
an air carrier.'5 3 For example, tort claims that arise from an air-
line bumping passengers from a flight, resulting in fatigue and
exhaustion, can be preempted by the ADA as the mistreatment
was a direct result of the airline rendering a service.1 5 4 Finally,
the third prong of the test seeks to establish the reasonableness
of the air carrier's actions."' As long as the action in question is
"reasonably necessary," ADA preemption can apply; however, if
the action is "outrageous or unreasonable," it is likely that ADA
preemption will not apply.'"' For example, rude service, while
perhaps unprofessional, does not rise to the level of "outra-
geous" so as to prevent application of ADA preemption.1 5 1 On
the other hand, claims involving "assault, battery, false arrest, or
false imprisonment" would rise to the level of "outrageous," and
would not be preempted by the ADA.' 5 s While the three-prong
test created by then-Judge Sotomayor delves further into an air
carrier's actions to determine whether or not they constitute a
service, there is a certain level of overlap between this method
and the ad hoc method used by other courts. And while the
results under each method may be divergent, typically, they are
congruent. Though a majority of circuits have interpreted the
term "services" in a broad manner, circuits are still split on the
proper analysis, and until either Congress or the Supreme Court
promulgates a more precise definition of the term, the incon-
gruity is likely to remain.
C. "PRICES"
The ADA's preemption provision also applies to statutes that
regulate the "prices" of air carriers.' 5 9 Though the term "prices"
is certainly less ambiguous than the term "services," determining
what does and does not in fact affect prices is not always clear-
cut. Air carriers are not susceptible to typical pricing structures;




156 Id. at 361-62.
157 Id. at 362.
1s Id. (citing Ruta v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 391, 399-401
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
15 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1) (2006).
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prices are driven largely by "yield management systems."'
Yield management systems are designed to schedule flights at
the maximum capacity possible.1 "' Because yield management
systems "allocate fare on a flight-by-flight, day-by-day basis," air-
lines are able to constantly monitor flight demand and make
necessary adjustments to prices to reflect need.16 2 Additionally,
air transportation prices are driven by competition between air-
lines.' Thus, because air transportation prices are not driven
by common cost bases, things that may appear to affect air car-
rier prices for the purpose of ADA preemption may in fact only
have an insignificant effect.1 6 4 For example, in Abdu-Brisson v.
Delta Airlines Inc., Delta argued that the ADA preempted plain-
tiffs' claims because "there [was] a direct relationship between
the relief sought and Delta's prices."15 The Second Circuit,
however, did not allow Delta to invoke ADA preemption, hold-
ing that because of the airline pricing structure, the plaintiffs'
claims would nave only an "inconsequential impact on Delta's
pricing," though they may affect fixed costs. 16
On the other hand, in Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., the First
Circuit held that the ADA did preempt airline customers' claims
for recovery of various fees associated with the purchase of tick-
ets that were never used.'16  Customers claimed that because the
fees occur after the prices "have been determined by the Air
Industry" their suit could not affect the prices.' 8 But the court
determined that the fees were "inextricably intertwined" with
the base fare, and as such, "when an airline establishes the base
fare, it must take cognizance of any surcharges that will be im-
posed by operation of law."169 Therefore, the claim for the tick-
eting fees would affect prices, so ADA preemption was
applicable. 7 o Typically, courts side with the reasoning in Buck
and find that the ADA does preempt suits for the refund of fees





165 Id. at 79.
166 Id.
167 Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007).
168 Id. at 35.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 36.
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associated with air travel.' 7 1 While the term "prices" is not as
ambiguous as the term "services," courts still occasionally strug-
gle with the application of "prices" because the price structure
behind airfare is driven by demand and not by cost bases, thus
making it difficult to determine what would and would not af-
fect ticket prices.
D. "AIR-CARRIER"
A fourth area of ambiguity in the ADA's preemption provision
is interpretation of the term "air carrier" and whether ADA pre-
emption can extend to entities other than actual airlines.
Courts have noted that "[n]othing in the ADA suggests that
§ 1305(a) applies only to suits against an air carrier" and in-
stead, the focus should be on whether the state law at issue has a
"'connection with or reference to' airline rates, routes or ser-
vices."172 Indeed, courts have extended ADA preemption to sev-
eral entities other than actual airlines.173 For example, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas determined
that the ADA could be extended to apply to an airline's parent
company. 74 1In Continental Airlines v. American Airlines, Conti-
nental filed a suit, alleging antitrust violations, against American
and its parent company, AMR Corporation (AMR) .17' AMR
claimed the suit was preempted by the ADA, but Continental
asserted that because AMR was "not an air carrier as defined by
the ADA," the ADA preemption provision did not apply.' 7 ' The
court, however, disagreed and found that interpreting the pre-
emption provision to apply only to claims against actual airlines
"would frustrate congressional intent."'77 In passing the ADA,
Congress sought to "assert federal control" over the regulation
of the airline industry. Thus, "it is preposterous to assume that
Congress intended to block the prosecution against air carriers
of certain suits but to allow those same suits to proceed against
171 Statland v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 998 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992); Lehman v.
USAIR Group, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 912, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Kaucky v. Sw. Airlines
Co., No. 96 C 750, 1996 WL 267875, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1996).
172 Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 696-97 (S.D.
Tex. 1993).
173 See id. at 697; Marlow v. AMR Servs. Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295, 299 (D. Haw.
1994); Huntleigh Corp. v. La. State Bd. of Private Sec. Exam'rs, 906 F. Supp. 357,
362 (M.D. La. 1995).
174 Cont'1 Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 696-97.




all others."1 7 ' Further, the court stressed that the overall aim of
the ADA's preemption provision is not to protect airlines in par-
ticular, but to avoid "the enforcement of any state laws that have
a 'connection with or reference to' airline rates, routes, or ser-
vices."1 79 Therefore, the claim against AMR alleging violations
of state laws was preempted.so
The ADA's preemption provision has also been extended to
jetbridge operators.'8 1 In Marlow v. AMR Services Corp., a former
employee alleged violations of a state whistleblower act against
his former employer, AMR Services, a jetbridge operator.'
AMR Services, however, claimed that the cause of action was
preempted by the ADA because, though they freely admitted
that they were not an air carrier, "section 1305 (a) (1) applies to
non-air carriers" and air carriers alike.' The court agreed with
this assertion and noted, like the court in Continental, that the
ADA preemption provision is meant specifically to prevent en-
forcement of any state laws that "have a 'connection with or ref-
erence to' airline rates, routes, or services," and not simply to
apply only to suits involving airlines.'8 4 Because jetbridges are
"an integral part of air carrier services, no matter who maintains
them," the former employee's cause of action against AMR Ser-
vices was preempted by the ADA.'
Further, the ADA's preemption provision has been extended
to predeparture screening companies." In Huntleigh Corp. V.
Louisiana State Board of Private Security Examiners, Huntleigh, a
corporation that contracted with airlines to provide predepar-
ture screening services, brought a suit against the state of Louisi-
ana, challenging Louisiana's regulation of the predeparture
screening industry. 187 While Huntleigh was not an airline, be-
cause Huntleigh was "certainly an agent of an air-carrier," state
regulation "would frustrate the intent of Congress to provide
uniform federal standards."1 88 Because the Louisiana law "af-
178 Id. at 697.
179 Id. at 696-97.
180 Id. at 697.
181 Marlow v. AMR Servs. Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295, 299 (D. Haw. 1994).
182 Id. at 297.
183 Id. at 297-98.
18 Id. at 298.
185 Id. at 299.
186 See generally Huntleigh Corp. v. La. State Bd. of Private Sec. Exam'rs, 906 F.
Supp. 357 (M.D. La. 1995).
187 Id. at 358.
188 Id. at 362.
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fects the 'services' of air carriers," the law was within the reach of
the ADA's preemption provision.1 8 9  Therefore, Huntleigh
could take advantage of ADA preemption.
Though the ADA's preemption provision has been extended
to include an airline's parent company, a jetbridge operator,
and a predeparture screening company, courts are careful not
to extend the provision to entities that are too tenuously or re-
motely related to air carriers."'o For example, in Steams Airport
Equipment Co. v. FMC Corp., a provider of airline boarding
bridges argued that a competitor's suit alleging violation of anti-
trust laws was preempted by the ADA because the state law
claims "necessarily relate to rates and services in the airline in-
dustry," as the jetbridge provider was an air carrier under the
preemption provision.'9 1 The court disagreed, however, finding
that the provider was too remotely related to air carriers to be
preempted.1 9 2 Unlike the jetbridge operator in Marlow, the is-
sue in this case was "not maintenance and servicing" of the jet-
bridge, but instead the actual sale of jetbridges themselves.1 9 3
To allow the provider here to take advantage of the ADA's pre-
emption would create a slippery slope, suggesting that "any cost
associated with building an airport would necessarily relate to
the rates or services of an airline."" Therefore, while courts
have extended the ADA's preemption provisions to entities be-
yond air carriers themselves, courts are still careful to ensure
that the entity is not too tenuously related to air carriers so as to
affect only rates, routes, or services in a remote or peripheral
manner.19 5
Though no court has specifically addressed the issue of
whether or not the ADA preemption statute applies to internet
travel agencies, two courts have addressed ADA application to
brick-and-mortar travel agencies." An Ohio appellate division
court, in an unpublished opinion, addressed the issue of
whether the ADA's preemption provision could apply to a travel
189 Id. at 361.






19 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992).
19 See Kneuss v. Ritenour, No. 2001-AP110097, 2002 WL 31518175 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 6, 2002); El-Menshawy v. Egypt Air, 647 A.2d 491, 493 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1994).
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agency.19 7 The court postulated that the ADA preempted a state
statute that governed consumer sales practices directed against
airlines in a suit by a customer against a travel agent for the cost
of a trip after the customers missed their scheduled flight.19 s
However, the court went on to state that ADA preemption did
not include "business activities of travel agent[s]" without ex-
panding on its reasoning.19' Thus, while this case may indicate
that internet travel agencies, and travel agents as an industry,
may not be able to take advantage of the ADA's preemption pro-
vision, the holding is far from concrete and provides little rea-
son not to apply the provision to travel agencies.
In El-Menshawy v. Egypt Air passengers brought suit against an
airline for failing to honor confirmed reservations and against a
travel agent for failing to confirm those reservations. 20 0 The
court decided, without extensive discussion, that the claims
against the airline were preempted by the ADA, but then the
court delved further into the issue of whether or not ADA pre-
emption could apply to the travel agent.201 The court focused
on the preemption provision's language-"relating to rates,
routes, or services of any air carrier"-and paid special attention
to the phrase "air carrier."2 0 2 The court opined that if a travel
agent can fit within the FAA's definition of "air carrier," the
travel agent might successfully take advantage of the ADA's pre-
emption provision. 20 s The FAA defines "air carrier" as one "who
undertakes, whether directly or indirectly or by a lease or any
other arrangement, to engage in air transportation."o2 0  To de-
termine what exactly constitutes an "indirect air carrier," gui-
dance can be found in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and
in case law. "Indirect air carriers" are described by the CAB as:
[A]ny persons whose relationship to the public is such that the
passengers with whom they deal are well aware that the transpor-
tation which is being offered will subsequently be provided by an
airline pursuant to arrangements with such person, but where
the person is not acting as an authorized agent of any airline in
197 Knetus, 2002 WL 31518175, at *1-2.
198 Id. at *3.
199 Id.
200 EI-Menshawy, 647 A.2d at 491-92.
201 Id. at 493.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 494.
204 Id. at 493-94 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. §1301(3) (1958)).
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the consummation of arrangements between any such airline
and the passengers.205
Therefore, a travel agent can only fit within the definition of "air
carrier" and thus take advantage of the ADA's preemption provi-
sion "if it can be determined that it indirectly is engaged in air
transportation."20
The court noted that the FAA also defines the term "ticket
agent" and points out that a travel agent may alternatively fall
under this category.o7 The term "ticket agent" is defined by the
FAA as "[a]ny person, not an air carrier .. . who, as principle or
agent, sells or offers for sale any air transportation, or negotiates
for, or holds himself out by solicitation, advertisement, or other-
wise as one who sells, provides, furnishes, contracts or arranges
for, such transportation. "208 Because the ADA's preemption
provision applies to "air carriers" but not to "ticket agents," the
question of which category the travel agent falls under "must
necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances or its activities in
relation to the events in question."2 09 The court did not ulti-
mately decide whether or not the travel agent in El-Menshawy
could take advantage of the ADA's preemption provision be-
cause the travel agent's materials before the court made no ar-
gument either way.210
Additional case law discussing the application of ADA pre-
emption to travel agents does not offer much guidance. Travel
agents have been involved in suits dealing with the preemption
provision, but predominantly on the claimant side. 2 11 Travel
agents' claims against airlines are treated the same as any other
claimants, with the court deciding whether or not to apply ADA
preemption based on the claim itself and the surrounding cir-
cumstances.21 2 For example, the Seventh Circuit gave no defer-
ence to the fact that a travel agency was the claimant.213 The
205 Id. at 494.
206 Id. (original emphasis).
207 Id.
208 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(32) (1958)).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 188 (3d Cir.
1998); Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423,
1427 (7th Cir. 1996); Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d
751, 752 (7th Cir. 1989).
212 See Taj Mahal Travel, Inc., 164 F.3d at 194-95; Travel All Over the World, Inc.,
73 F.3d at 1427-28; Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc., 889 F.2d at 751-53.
213 Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc., 899 F.2d at 754.
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court held that the travel agency's claims against an airline for
terminating an agency relationship and for refusing to allow the
travel agency to advertise discounted tickets on that airline's
flights were preempted by the ADA because the claims related
to "rates, routes, or services" provided by the airline. 2 14 Like-
wise, the Third Circuit gave no consideration to the fact that
one of the litigants was a travel agency and, instead, held that
the travel agent's defamation claim was not preempted by the
ADA, reasoning that the action was "simply 'too tenuous, re-
mote, or peripheral' to be subject to preemption, even though
[the airline's] statements refer to ticketing, arguably a 'ser-
vice.' "215 Thus, courts typically view travel agencies as ordinary
litigants and offer no special ADA treatment.
IV. ADA APPLICATION TO INTERNET
TRAVEL AGENCIES
Because there is little case law answering the question of
whether or not internet travel agencies may take advantage of
the ADA's preemption provision, answers must instead be in-
ferred from congressional intent and strict application of the
statute's requirement of "relates to" the "rates, routes, or ser-
vices" of an "airline." Through analysis of each of these terms,
depending upon the factual circumstances in an individual case,
the ADA's preemption provision may in fact be applied to in-
ternet travel agencies.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
First, looking at the congressional intent behind the ADA,
one reoccurring theme emerges: the overarching goal of the
ADA was "to encourage, develop, and attain an air transporta-
tion system which relies on competitive market forces to deter-
mine the quality, variety, and price of air services. "216 The
theory behind airline deregulation was that if government re-
strictions were removed, "maximum reliance on competitive
market forces would best further efficiency, innovation, and low
prices as well as variety [and] quality ... of air transportation
services.""2 1 Further, deregulation would allow easier entry into
214 Id.
215 Taj Mahal Travel, Inc., 164 F.3d at 195.
216 Frenette, supra note 51, at 174.
217 Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted).
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the marketplace for emerging airlines.2 1 8 It is important to re-
member that before the ADA and its preemption provision, the
heavily-regulated airline industry was not succeeding. To resus-
citate the airline industry, Congress wanted to ensure that noth-
ing stood in the way of the free operation of the marketplace.1 9
Many factors go into providing successful airline service, such
as: the planes themselves; ticketing, boarding, and baggage pro-
cedures; ticket purchasing; and food service. In short, airline
service is multifaceted. To say that something that customers
connect to airline service-such as ticket sales-is not actually
related to airline service for the purposes of the ADA because
the tickets were not sold by the airline itself would directly con-
tradict congressional intent. The goal of the preemption provi-
sion was to allow competitive market forces to flow-nothing in
this goal, however, hints that the ADA may not apply to entities
such as internet travel agencies.220 Indeed, some courts have
postulated that to interpret the statute as only applying to air
carriers would "frustrate congressional intent."22 1
However, courts attempting to apply the ADA's preemption
provision to internet travel agencies must be careful to interpret
properly the statute at issue and its purpose. The various steps
and analysis courts utilize to interpret the ambiguous sections of
the preemption provision serve as a type of check on congres-
sional intent, ensuring that the statute is not construed too
broadly. But regardless of which tests or methods courts em-
ploy, it is important that courts look not to what entity is seeking
ADA preemption but, instead, to the statute or regulation's pur-
pose and the effect it has on the prices, routes, or services of air
carriers. By focusing on this inquiry, courts can best serve con-
gressional intent in their application of the ADA's preemption
provision.
B. THE "RELATES To" INQUIRY
Next, examining the language of the ADA's preemption pro-
vision itself provides some guidance to determine whether in-
ternet travel agencies may take advantage of the provision. First,
it is pertinent to establish whether or not services provided by
218 Calvin Davison, The Two Faces of Section 105 - Airline Shield or Airport Sword,
56 J. AIR L. & COM. 93, 94 (1990).
219 Id. at 105.




internet travel agencies "relate to" airline prices, routes, or ser-
vices. The seminal case on this issue is Morales.2 22 The term "re-
lates to," the court postulated, is meant to be a broad one;
indeed, the plain meaning of the phrase itself suggests this.2 2 3
Additional evidence of the fact that the phrase "relates to" is
inherently broad can be found in Black's Law Dictionary, which
defines the term as "to stand in some relation; to have bearing
or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or
connection with," as well as in the interpretation of other stat-
utes that use the phrase, such as the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act. 2 24 Both of these sources indicate that the
term "relates to" is construed broadly. 225
Because the term "relates to" is construed broadly, if a state
invoked a statute that regulated internet travel agencies, it is
possible that internet travel agencies could utilize the ADA's
preemption provision. Internet travel agencies and the services
they offer are deeply integrated with airlines. At their core, the
purpose of internet travel agencies is to sell airline tickets. With-
out a ticket, a person cannot travel by airplane. Further, several
internet travel agencies have deep-seeded roots in the airline in-
dustry. For example, Travelocity emerged out of the Sabre sys-
tem, which served as airlines' electronic booking system for
decades prior to the inception of Travelocity. 2 2 6 Therefore, it is
likely that any statute seeking to regulate internet travel agencies
could be found to "relate to" airline rates, routes, and services.
To prohibit internet travel agencies from using the ADA's pre-
emption provision would hinder the competitive market forces
that Congress intended to govern the air travel industry when it
passed the ADA. To allow states to regulate internet travel agen-
cies would be to allow states to "undo federal deregulation with
regulation of their own."2 2 ' Thus, state regulation of internet
travel agencies could "relate to" the prices, routes, and services
of air carriers.
C. THE "PRICES, ROUTES, OR SERVICES" INQUIRY
The next step in determining whether an internet travel
agency may fall within the purview of the ADA's preemption
222 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
223 Id. at 383.
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 See discussion of Travelocity supra Part I.A.
227 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378-79.
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provision is to determine whether the cause of action at issue
involving the internet travel agency relates to the "price, routes,
or services" of an air carrier. Interpretation of the term "ser-
vices" is heavily reliant on the facts and circumstances in each
situation and also depends on which definition of "services" the
jurisdiction deciding the issue follows. As noted above, some
courts have adopted a very narrow definition of the term "ser-
vices," determining that only "the provision of air transportation
to and from various markets at various times" constitutes a "ser-
vice. "228 Under this narrow definition, internet travel agencies
may not succeed in establishing that ADA preemption should
apply to their actions since internet travel agencies are not in
the business of providing the actual air transport itself. Courts
that promote a more narrow definition of services generally
opine that to promulgate a broader definition of services would
run the risk of extending the statute beyond congressional in-
tent.2 29 Thus, even if internet travel agencies are able to suc-
ceed in showing a state statute at issue "relates to" the airline
industry, because internet travel agencies are not in the business
of providing the actual air transport, the second prong in deter-
mining whether a cause of action would be preempted by the
ADA would not be met.
However, most circuits reject this narrow construction of the
term "services" and, instead, utilize a broad definition that in-
cludes a wide array of events and circumstances that relate to air
travel. Under this definition, an occurrence can be deemed a
"service" as long as it "refer[s] to the provision or anticipated
provision of labor from the airline to its passengers," and it can
include events such as "boarding procedures, baggage handling,
and food and drink."2 3 0 Under this broad interpretation of "ser-
vices," internet travel agencies could succeed in proving that
their actions are a "service" for the purposes of the ADA's pre-
emption provision. Indeed, the business of organizing, provid-
ing, and selling airline tickets can be referred to as "the
provision or anticipated provision of labor from the airline to its
passengers." 2 3 Thus, if a state enacted a statute regulating in-
ternet travel agencies in their sales practices, the internet travel
agencies could show that their ticket selling practices are a "ser-
vice" related to airlines.
228 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998).
229 See id.




Determining whether an activity fits within the broad defini-
tion of the term "services" is not completely straightforward. As
noted in Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.,23 2 courts have adopted
various methodologies to determine whether an action may in
fact be classified as a "service. "233 Under the ad hoc method, the
court would "examine the totality of the circumstances" to deter-
mine whether the action at issue is a "service. "234 This approach
focuses heavily on the facts at hand, and because it is an intense
factual determination, it is difficult to determine whether or not
internet travel agencies pass this test. If a state statute regulated
a minor part of an internet travel agency's ticket sales proce-
dures or dealt with some other aspect of the business that was
only tangentially related to airlines, internet travel agencies may
not be able to invoke ADA preemption. However, if the state
statute regulated an area of internet travel agencies' business
that was more closely related to airlines, then under an ad hoc
approach internet travel agencies could show that the statute
sufficiently relates to airline service.
Instead of this ad hoc method, a court may use a second
methodology to determine whether an action constitutes a "ser-
vice"-the three-part test laid out by then-Judge Sotomayor in
Rombom.2 35 Though the first prong of the test is virtually the
same as the ad hoc approach and would depend on the same
sorts of factual determinations, the second and third prongs of
the test may operate to a different effect.23 6 If the activity in
question is deemed a service under the first prong, "the court
must then determine whether the claim affects the airline ser-
vice directly or tenuously, remotely, or peripherally."2 1' This
prong of the test-determining whether the claims go directly
rather than remotely to the service established in the first
prong-is also heavily dependent on the facts in each case. As
long as the activity at issue "directly implicates a service," this
prong of the test is met.23 8 For example, a claim arising from an
internet travel agency's refusal to mail a customer's ticket would
meet this prong because it stems from the denial of services it-
232 471 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
233 Id. at 359.
234 Id.
235 See Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
236 See id.
237 Id. at 222.
238 Id.
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self.2 39 On the other hand, a negligence action arising out of a
severe paper cut that a customer suffered when he opened the
envelope containing the ticket would fail this prong because it
falls outside the domain of services provided by the internet
travel agency. In this case, the internet travel agency would not
be able to take advantage of ADA preemption. 24 0 As to the third
prong of the test, the underlying conduct at issue must be "rea-
sonably necessary to the provision of the service."24 1 This prong
would insulate actions that would be so out of the ordinary or
outrageous as to fall outside the purview of the ADA's aims.24 2
"Unreasonable" has been interpreted to mean necessarily rising
to the level of outrageousness. 243 Actions may rise to the level of
"rude" or "unprofessional" without being unreasonable.2 4 4
Therefore, as long as the internet travel agency's actions were
not outrageous, the third prong of this test would be satisfied.
Thus, if the jurisdiction in which an issue involving an internet
travel agency is being adjudicated utilizes the three-part test laid
out by then-Judge Sotomayor in Rombom, whether or not the ac-
tion at issue constitutes a "service" is heavily based on the facts at
hand.2 4 5 In some cases, an internet travel agency may be able to
invoke ADA preemption, yet, in other cases the services the in-
ternet travel agency provides may be deemed too remote or pe-
ripheral to successfully invoke ADA preemption. Each prong of
the test must be met to successfully show that the action consti-
tutes a service, and if the internet travel agency fails to satisfy any
one of these prongs, it would not be able to successfully invoke
the ADA's preemption provision.2 4 6
However, if the "services" inquiry is not met, internet travel
agencies may be able to show the issue at hand relates to the
"prices" of air carriers. For example, in Abdu-Brisson, Delta
sought to establish application of the ADA's preemption provi-
sion by arguing that the claim at issue was an attempt to manipu-
late the economic terms of Delta's purchase of Pan American





243 Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 2d 356, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
244 Id.
245 See Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 121-22.
246 See id.
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prices.24 7 However, the Second Circuit determined that this
claim would not allow Delta to take advantage of the ADA's pre-
emption provision because, although the plaintiffs' demands
may have increased costs, the unique price structure of the air-
line industry would cause the satisfaction of the demands to
have "an inconsequential impact" on pricing.248 Therefore,
though the ADA preempts statutes that have an effect on the
"prices" of airlines, since airlines are not susceptible to common-
cost basis concerns, things that would seemingly effect airline
prices may in fact be inconsequential. But, because the ADA
preempts state statutes that have a detrimental effect on air car-
rier prices, if the issue at hand has the effect of raising or lower-
ing air carrier prices, internet travel agencies could take
advantage of the ADA's preemption provision.
D. THE "AIR CARRIER" INQUIRY
Finally, it is important to determine whether internet travel
agencies can be classified as "air carriers" for the purposes of the
ADA's preemption provision. As noted above, the ADA's pre-
emption provision is not meant to apply to airlines exclu-
sively. 2 1 Indeed, the aim of the ADA was not to protect airlines
themselves, but to ensure that the industry operated in a free
market environment.250 To best achieve this goal, preemption
necessarily needs to apply to entities other than just airlines.
Courts have extended the ADA's preemption provision to a
variety of other entities, including airline parent companies, jet-
bridge operators, and preboading security providers. Courts
have been careful to adhere to the aims and goals of the ADA
and have promulgated a flexible application of the term "air-
line."2 51 Those courts look to see what it is that each of the enti-
ties claiming ADA preemption do in relation to airlines and the
services they provide. 2 5 2 Where the internet travel agency re-
lates in such a way that their operation is a necessary part of the
247 Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
248 Id. at 85.
249 See El-Menshawy v. Egypt Air, 647 A.2d 491, 493-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1994).
250 Abdu-Brisson, 128 F.3d at 84.
251 See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 696-97 (S.D.
Tex. 1996); Marlow v. AMR Servs. Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295, 298 (D. Haw. 1994);
Huntleigh Corp. v. La. State Bd. of Private Sec. Exam'rs, 906 F. Supp. 357, 360
(M.D. La. 1995).
252 See, e.g., Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 696-97.
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air travel process, courts typically classify that entity as an "air
carrier." However, courts are also careful to ensure they do not
apply the provision so loosely as to promulgate rules that would
essentially allow any entity to take advantage of the ADA's pre-
emption provision.
Courts have noted that there are two very similar definitions
that a travel agency may fall under: "indirect air carrier" and
"ticket agent."2 5  It is certainly feasible that an internet travel
agency could fall within the definition of "indirect air carriers."
The same predicament may also apply to internet travel agen-
cies. "Indirect air carriers" are described by the CAB as:
[Any persons whose relationship to the public is such that the
passengers with whom they deal are well aware that the transpor-
tation which is being offered will subsequently be provided by an
airline pursuant to arrangements with such person, but where
the person is not acting as an authorized agent of any airline in
the consummation of arrangements between any such airline
and the passengers. 254
Internet travel agencies' customers are typically aware that the
transportation being offered by the internet travel agencies "will
subsequently be provided by an airline pursuant to arrange-
ments" between the internet travel agency and the customer.
Further, internet travel agencies do not serve as "authorized
agent[s] of any airline in the consummation of arrangements"
between airlines and customers. 5 6 While internet travel agen-
cies may fall under the definition of "indirect air carriers," it is
equally feasible to fit internet travel agencies into the definition
of "ticket agent." "[T]icket agent" is defined as not being an air
carrier, that is one who offers or sells air transportation or who
holds himself out as one who is "selling, providing, or arranging
for" air transport.5  Internet travel agencies fit this description
too. Therefore, whether an internet travel agency fits more into
the definition of "indirect air carrier" or "ticket agent" must be
left up to courts to determine based on the facts and circum-
stances in a case.
Internet travel agencies and the services they provide are
more closely related to the prices, routes, and services of an air-





257 49 U.S.C. § 40102(45) (2006).
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line than other entities that have successfully invoked ADA pre-
emption, like airline-parent companies, jetbridge operators, or
predeparture screening companies.2 5" For example, in Marlow
v. AMR Services Corp., ajetbridge operator was allowed to success-
fully invoke ADA preemption because the state law at issue in
the case "relate Ed] to airline routes, rates or services."2 " Cer-
tainly an internet travel agency-a company that is integrated
into the provision of the air transport itself-is more closely re-
lated to an airline than ajetbridge operator. Thus, the point of
focus in determining whether this part of the ADA's preemption
provision is met is heavily dependent on the facts in each situa-
tion. Depending on which definition the internet travel agency
at issue falls under, it may or may not be able to take advantage
of the ADA's preemption provision.
V. CONCLUSION
Today, more people are traveling by air than ever before. To
best accommodate air travelers, internet travel agencies
emerged and grew to occupy a significant role in the air travel
industry. Just as with the last rise in air travel in the mid and late
1970s, how to (or how not to) regulate air travel entities has
become an issue. To best ensure that market forces would drive
the aviation industry, Congress passed the ADA in 1978, which
included a preemption provision to prevent states from undoing
deregulation. Since its inception, the preemption provision has
been the source of confusion and ambiguity. Courts have strug-
gled with the meaning of the term "relates to," the phrase
"rates/prices, routes, or services," and the term "air carrier."
Each has been subject to differing interpretations, which often
depend heavily on the facts in an individual case.
A broad, flexible preemption provision was exactly what Con-
gress intended when it passed the preemption provision. But
whether the provision was intended to go so far as to preempt
regulation of internet travel agencies is yet to be determined.
The ADA's preemption provision has in fact applied to entities
other than airlines, and nothing in the statute prevents the pro-
vision from extension to internet travel agencies. Factual deter-
258 See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 696-97 (S.D.
Tex. 1996); Marlow v. AMR Servs. Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295, 298-99 (D. Haw.
1994); Huntleigh Corp. v. La. State Bd. of Private Sec. Exam'rs., 906 F. Supp. 357,
360 (M.D. La. 1995).
259 Marlow, 870 F. Supp. at 298 (internal quotations omitted).
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minations are important in deciding whether the ADA's
preemption provision applies in any situation. In those situa-
tions when the ADA has applied to entities other than airlines, it
is typically due to a close correlation between what that entity
does and its effect on the airline industry. Where an entity is
merely tangentially connected to the prices, routes, and services
of air carriers, the ADA preemption will not apply.
Just as the climate in the air transportation industry shifted in
the late 1970s, the climate has again changed with the emer-
gence and growth of the internet. Congress wanted airline der-
egulation to be a flexible concept. Though Congress likely did
not anticipate the development of internet travel agencies when
it promulgated the ADA's preemption provision, the nature of
these companies and the services they provide indeed allow in-
ternet travel agencies to squeeze into the ADA's preemption
provision if the facts and circumstances in a given case com-
mand it.
740 [ 75
